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RECENT CASES
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-DISBARAENT-GRouNDS.AIN 
RE RADFORD, 134N. W., 473 (MIcH.)...Held, that the power of the courts to disbar anattorney is not limited to cases where he has been convicted of crime orOf misconduct in a professional capacity, but may be exercised in casesof conduct, though not in the capacity of an attorney, which show hischaracter to be such as to unfit him to be intrusted with the office.
It may be stated in general terms that, when the proper grounds exist,an attorney may be disbarred from practice. People v. Goodrich, 79 Ill:,148; State v. Harber, 129 Mo., 271; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U. S.),335. The misconduct may be unconnected with his profession, and thegist of the action is his unfitness to manage the legal business of others.Jones' Case, 2 Pa. Dist., 538. But the reason for such disbarment shouldbe most weighty. Ex. P. Secoinbe, 19 How. (U. S.), 9; State v. Stiles.Such matters as conviction for a crime are, prima facia, grounds for dis-barment. People v. Schintz, 181 Ill., 574; State v. Chapma, 11 Ohio, 430.Or, the failure of an attorney to show fiduciary relations towards hisclient is good ground for suspension or disbarment. Baker v. State, 90 Ga.,153;- State v. Davis, 92 Tenn, 634; Jeffries v. Laurie, 23 Fed., 786. " Eventhe- use of rude conduct and offensive language towards the judge person-ally, is sufficient for the Court to disbar him. State v. Maxwell, 19 Fla., 31;United States v. Green, 85 Fed., 857. It appears, also, by the weight ofauthority, that, if the misconduct constitutes an indictable offense, theCourt will disbar the attorney even though there had been no previousindictment and conviction. Perry v. State, 3 Greene (Ia.), 550; State v.W4inton, 11 Oregon, 456; Smith v. State, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.), 228. Contra,Breen v. State, 22 Ark., 149; People v. Treadwell, 66 Col., 400. But somecourts hold that statutes do not restrict the general powers of the Courtover the attorneys, thus they may be removed for other than statutorygrounds. Boston Bar Assoc. v. Greenhood, 168 Mass., 169; In re Boone,83 Fed., 944. Contra, In re Eaton, 4 N. D., 514; Kane v. Haywood, 66N. C., 1.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-NEGLIGENCE OF ATTORNEY-DAMAGES.FLYNNET AL. V. JUDGE, 133 N. Y. S., 794.-Held, that the only damages claimedfrom negligence of an attorney being loss in money, the measure thereofis the difference in the pecuniary position of the client from what it wouldhave been had there been no negligence.
The measure of damages caused by the negligence of an attorney isthe amount of loss actually sustained and not the nominal amount claimedin the suit. Eccles v. Stephenson, 6 Ky., 517; Dearborn v. Dearborn, 16Mass., 316; Crooker v. Hutchinson, 2 D. Chip., 117. An attorney wholoses a client's cause of action by his negligence is liable for the actual as
RECENT CASES 681
well as the exemplary damages 
which the client might have recovered 
in
an action thereon. Patterson v. Vallace & 
Fraer, 79 S. W., 1077. And
if he causes his client to lay himself open to criminal 
prosecution, punitive
damages are proper. Hill v. Montgomery, 
84 Ill. App., 300. And want of
diligence on the part of the client 
will not affect his liability. Cox 
v. Sulli-
van, 7 Ga., 144. If an attorney fails 
to bring suit when engaged so to do,
he is liable for whatever amount 
might have been recovered 
had he
brought suit. Gilbert -v. JVilliams, 
8 Mass., 51; Fitch v. Scott, 4 Miss., 
314.
But if he could not have recovered 
had lie maintained the action, 
he is
liable for nominal damages only. 
Grayson v. Wilkinson, 13 Miss., 
268.
And the amount of the attorney's 
fee is immaterial. Irwin v. VanPelt, 
56
N. Y., 417. Even if he acts gratuitously. 
Lawall v. Groman, 80 Pa. St.,
532. And champerty cannot be set 
up as a defense, Goodman v. Walker,
30 Ala., 482.
BILLS AND NOTES-STIPULATIONS 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEEs-LIQUIDATEI
DA.MAGES.FIRsT NATIONAL BANK CF VICKSBURG 
v. MAYER, 57 Sou. (LA.),
30S.-Held, that a stipulation in 
a note for 10 per cent attorney's 
fees, if
the note is placed in the hands 
of an attorney for collection, is 
a stipula-
tion for liquidated damages, and 
the fees are recoverable in an 
action on
the note without any proof that 
they were incurred.
As to stipulations on the face of 
a note providing for the payment 
of
attorney's fees there is mach conflict. 
The decisions on this much mooted
point have not turned upon the 
question whether the amount of 
the fees
was fixed or indefinite. Wfilson 
Sewing Machine Co. v. Moreno, 
7 Fed.,
806; Myer v. Hart, 40 lich., 517. 
Many cases hold the stipulation 
void,
as against public policy; Witherspoon-v. 
Mussehnan, 14 Bush. (Ky.), 214;
Myer v. Hart, supra; as tending 
to encourage litigation, and oppress 
the
debtor; Finley v. Hopkins, 111 N. C., 
340; as usurious; Wright v. Traver,
73 Mich., 493; Dow v. Undike, 
11 Nebr., 94; as an agreement 
for a
penalty; Bullock '. Taylor, 39 
Mich., 137. The weight of authority,
however, seems to support the 
principal case in holding that such 
a stipu-
lation is val'd. Bowie v. Hall, 69 
Md., 433; W$illiams v. Flowers, 
90 Ala., 136.
In some of these jurisdictions, 
it is held, that while the stipulation 
is not
void, it destroys the negotiability 
of the note. Banking Co. v. Gay, 
63 Mo.,
33; Wood v. North, 84 Pa. St., 407. 
The majority of such cases, however,
hold that the negotiability of the 
note is not affected. Seaton v. 
Scoville,
18 Kans., 433; Sperry v. Horr, 
32 Iowa, 184.
CARRIERS-CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS-PERSONAL 
INJ URIES--LIABILITY.-
LOUiSVILLE & N. R. Co. v. BREWER, 
143 S. V. (KY.), 1014.-Held, a carrier
is not liable for injuries to a 
pregnant female passenger caused 
by the
unnatural appearance and conduct 
of a lunatic passenger in charge 
of an
attendant, where the female passenger 
made no complaint to any officer 
of
the train, and where none of them 
knew of her physical condition, 
or that
the lunatic was giving her any 
inconvenience, and where the 
lunatic was
not violent.
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A carrier of passengers is not an insurer of their safety. Gardner v.N. Jersey Traction Co., 58 N. J. L., 176; McPadden v. N. Y. Central R.Co., 44 N. Y., 478. It is firmly established that its liability is based onnegligence. Readhead v. Midland R. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B., 412; Stokes v.Saltonstall, 13 Pet. (U. S.), 181. The weight of authority holds that acarrier is bound to exercise the highest degree of care, skill, and diligencein the protection of passengers from injury by fellow passengers. Louis-ville & N. R Co. v. Finn, 16 Ky. L. R., 57; Pittsburg & C. R. Co. v.Pillow, 76 Pa. St, 510; Penn R. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S., 451, but some courtshold that only ordinary care and diligence is required. Chicago & A. R.Co. v. Pillsbury 123 Ill., 9; Ill. C. R. Co. v. Minor, 69 Miss., 710. Thecarrier is not liable for the wrongs and indignities of fellow passengersunless they might have been foreseen and guarded against, or had n6tice ofsuch wrongful conduct. Simmons v. Steamship Co., 97 Mass., 361; Story on• Bailments, Sec. 661. A carrier will be liable for injuries to a pregnantwoman by reason of negligence, although such injury is occasioned by hercondition. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Leapley, 65 Md., 571. If the passen-ger is known to be under a physical or mental disability, a higher degreeof attention is required than for an ordinary person. Burke v. C. & N. TV.R. Co., 18 I1. App., 565; Memphis St. R. Co. v. Shaw, 110 Tenn., 467; butsee contra, Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 172 Mass., 488. A Nebraskastatute provides that the carrier shall be liable for all damages to passen-gers unless the injured party be criminally negligent or violated a knownrule of the company. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Zernecke, 59 Neb., 689.
CARRIERS-PASSENGERS-SAFE PLACE TO ALIGHT-CARRIER'S OBLIGA-TIONs.-LouIsVILLF & S. I. TRACTION Co. v. WALKER, 97 N. E., 151 (IN.).-Held, the rule requiring only ordinary care on the part of railroads inmaintaining safe places for the ingress and egress of passengers atstations cannot be extended to cases where the railroad requires a passen-ger to alight on a dangerous roadway in order to change cars for the com-
pletion of the journey.
The extreme liability of the carrier for the safety of passengers isgenerally recognized as being modified to reasonable care in its applica-tion to stations and depots. Palmer v. Penn. Co., 111 N. Y., 488; Conroy v.Chicago, etc., R. Co., 96 Wis., 243; Elliott on Railroads, Sec. 1590. If astation be actually unsafe for use it is recognized that an absolute liabilityattaches to the carrier. Falk v. New York, S. & N. R. Co., 56 N. J. Law,380. The authorities are not in accord as to the duty of the carrier inbeing responsible in an absolute degree for the safety of a passengeralighting between stations. The better rule would seem to be that thecarrier is liable for negligence in such cases, provided the conductor knewof the passenger's intention to alight. Beringer v. Dubuque St. Ry. Co..118 Ia., 135; Jacobson v. St. Louis Transit Co., 106 Mo. App., 339. It hasbeen held that the employes of a street car have a right to assume thata passenger will notice an excavation in the stret, Bigelow v. [Vest EndSt. Ry. Co., 161 Mass., 393; but the rule in the principal case is directly
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supported in Richmond City Ry. 
Co. v. Scott, 86 Va., 902, and Cincinnati,
N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Richardson, 
14 Ky. Law Rep., 367. The carrier
is generally held liable for negligent 
direction in inducing a passenger 
to
leave a train, Laub v. Chicago, 
B. & 0. Ry. Co., 118 Mo. App., 488, 
but
there is authority that it is not 
the carrier's duty to assist the passenger,
by direction or otherwise, in alighting. 
Rabcn v. Central Iowa Ry., 73 Ia.,
579.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF LAws-DIScRIMINATION
Br~WEEN RACES.-PEOPLE V. RoBiNsON, 
132 N. Y. Surp., 674.-Held, in pro-
ceedings before a magistrate for 
disorderly conduct consisting in 
sending
to a -,oman letters declaring love 
and insisting and proposing marriage,
the reception over defendant's objection 
of evidence that he is of the negro
race, and the taking of that fact 
into consideration by the magistrate, 
do
not violate any constitutional right 
of the defendant, and do not deprive
him of the equal protection of the 
laws, nor discriminate against him 
on
account of race or color.
The promotion of colored persons 
to citizenship is not an admission
of them to all the rights and privileges 
of white persons, in the same man-
ner and to the same extent. Green 
v. State, 58 Ala., 190. There 
may be
discriminations between classes 
of persons where reasons exist 
which
make them necessary or advisable, 
but there can be none based upon
grounds purely arbitrary. Story 
on the Constitution, Sec. 1961. 
Equal
protection of the law means that 
all have access to the same courts, 
like
.rules of evidence are required, 
and no discrimination in degree 
of liability
incurred or punishment inflicted 
for a violation of the laws. Pace 
v.
Alabama, 106 U. S., 583; In re 
Grice, 79 Fed., 627; Hayes v. Missouri,
120 U. S., 68. The legislature 
may provide a special punishment 
for a
special class of offenders. E.r parte 
Liddell, 93 Cal., 633; People v. Coon,
67 Hun. (N. Y.), 523. A statute 
providing that a person of one 
race be
punished more severely than a person 
of another race is invalid because
of race discrimination. Ho Ali 
Kow v. Nunan, 5 Sawy. (U. S.), 
552.
Excluding Chinese as witnesses 
for or against white persons is 
not dis-
crimination. Li Sing v. United States, 
180 U. S., 486. But a statute elim-
inating negroes from jury duty is 
invalid. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. 
S., 313.
Race and color may be made a 
constituent of an offense, provided 
it does
not lead to a discrimination in punishment. 




57 Sou. (ALA.), 76.-Held, that 
the public policy the Court is 
concerned
with in determining whether a 
contract is void is that evidenced 
by the
Constitution, the statutes, or definite 
principles of customary law, developed
by the course of judicial decisions, 
and the Court should not declare 
a
contract void on such a ground, except 
in a case free from doubt.,
Public policy of a state is not 
determined by the opinions of 
judges
as to the moral or social advantage 
of the community. U. S. v. Trans-
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Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S., 290; Mahorner v. Hooe, 9 S. & M.(Miss.), 247. It must be determined from the Constitution of a state, itsstatutes, and the decisions of its courts thereupon. Hartford Fire In.. Co.v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 70 Fed., 201; Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. St., 266.A contract is invalid on the ground of public policy if at the time of iismaking its general tendency was opposed to the principles of public wel-fare. Fuller v. Dane, 18 Pick. (Mass.), 472; Richardson v. Crandall, 48N. Y., 348. There is no necessity that in a particular case any injury tothe public has resulted. Firenten's Charitable Assn. v. Berger, 13 La. Ann.,209. In proving a contract invalid on the ground of its contravention ofptblic policy, as in proving it void on account of fraud or other illegality,the burden of proof is upon him who asserts its invalidity. Richardson v.Mellish, 2 Bing. (Eng.), 229; Boardman v. Thompson, 25 Iowa, 487.
CORPOPUTIONS-FREIGN CORPORATIONs-LImILITY 
TO SUIT-NOELCONST. Co. OF BALTIMORE CITY v. GEORGE V. S Ir & Co., 193 FED., 492.-Held, that a corporation of one State is liable to suit in another State onlywhen it is doing business therein.
It was fairly well settled at common law that a foreign corporationholding no property within a State could not be sued in that State. Andrewsv. 1fichigan Cent. R. Co., 99 Mass., 534; McQueen v. Middletown 1fg. Co.,16 Johns., 5. But even at common law, before the advent of statutes onthe topic, there was considerable authority holding that a foreign corpora-tion was bound by the service of process upon its officer in a State where itwas doing business. Burrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S., 100; ChosenFreeholders v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 42 N. J. L., 490. The common law,however, has largely yielded to statutes which have been passed in most ofthe States requiring foreign corporations doing business in other Statesto submit to their several jurisdictions when process is duly served ontheir local agents. Marshall on Private Corporations, Sec. 444. And aforeign corporation doing business in such a State is by the great weight ofauthority held to have at least impliedly assented to the statutes, and willbe bound by such a process. Merchants' Mfg. Co. v. Grand Trunk R. Co.,13 Fed., 358; Reyer v. Odd Fellows' Fraternal Accident Ass'n., 157 Mass.,367. But when a foreign corporation is not doing business within a State,a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over it by service of process upon anofficer of it who happens casually to come inside the State. Goldey v.Morning News, 156 U. S., 518; Newell v. Great Western R. Co., 19 Mich.,336. It becomes, therefore, of primary importance to determine what thestatutes mean by "doing business." While this is a matter in which eachcase must be considered individually, it seems that the balance of authorityclearly inclines toward the view that a single transaction does not neces-sarily bring the foreign corporation within the statutes. Cooper Mfg. Co. v'.Ferguson, 113 U. S., 727. Contra, State v. Bristol Savings Bank, 108 Ala., 3.Nor are repeated transactions, culminating in contracts which are con-summated outside the State, within the purview of the statutes even thoughthey have been solicited by itinerant agents within the State from State
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residents. Hazeltine v. Mississipp Valley 
F. Ins: Co., 55 Fed.,'7
43 ; Coit vw




CONTRACTING Co. v. CHATTERSON 
ET AL., 143 S. W., 6 (Ky.).-Held, 
thi
one contracting with a corporation 
is estopped to deny its charter 
power
to contract or corporate existence 
in an action to enforce the contract.
The early courts rigidly applied 
the principle that where a corporation
is attempting to enforce its ultra 
zires contracts courts of justice will 
.with-
hold their aid. Chillicothe Bank v. Swayne, 
8 Ohio, 257; New York.Fire-
wan Ins. Co. v. Ely, 5 Conn., 560. 
They applied it with equal rigor 
in
denying relief to persons contracting 
with corporations. McCullock v. 
Moss,
5 Den. (N. Y.), 567. But it is 
now a settled principle of law, 
where a
contract with a corporation, the 
making of which is beyond its 
granted
powers, has been fully executed 
by both parties, neither of them 
can assert
its invalidity as a ground of relief 
against it. Parish v. Wheeler, 22 
N. Y.,
494; Mitchell v. Beckman, 64 Cal., 
117. However, as long as an ultra 
vires
contract is wholly executory on 
both sides it is void, and neither 
party is
estopped to deny the power of 
the corporation to make it. Day 
v. Springs
Buggy Co., 57 Alich., 146; Thomas 
v. [Vest Jersey R. Co., 101 U. 
S.,.71.
Where the contract is executory 
on one side only, and has been executed
on the other, the courts differ as 
to whether an action will lie on 
the con-
tract by the party furnishing the 
consideration. Some courts hold 
that the
contract is void, and that no action 
will lie upon it. Cent. Transp. Co. 
v.
Pullman Palace Car Co., 139 U. 
S., 24; Davis v. Old Colony R. 
Co., 131
Mass., 258. Other courts hold with 
the principal case that the party receiv-
ing the consideration is estopped 
to set up the contract as ultra vires, 
in
order to defeat an action on the 
contract. Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow,
6 N.-Y., 62; Vright v . Pipe Line 
Co., 101 Pa. St., 204.
DANMAGEs-BREACH OF CONTRACT-MENTAL 
ANGUISH. TAXICAB Co. 
v.
GRANT, 57 So., 141 (ALA.) .- Held, 
that where a party to a contract 
suffered
inconvenience and physical discomfort 
in consequence of the adverse
party's breach of contract, mental 
distress proximately resulting from 
the
breach, constituted a ground for 
award of additional compensatory 
dam-
ages.
Mental anguish and distress, disconnected 
with physical injury, cannot,
as a general rule, be made the 
basis for a recovery of damages 
for a
breach of contract. Wilson v. Richmond, 
etc., R. Co., 52 Fed., 264; Russel 
v.
Western Union Tel Co., 3 Dak., 
315; Walsh v. Chicago, etc., R. 
Co., 42
Wis., 23. But many courts, with 
the principal case, reach a contrary 
con-
clusion. Renihan v. Wright, 125 
Ind., 536; Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 
Mass.,
580. However, the possibility of 
recovery for mental suffering, in, 
these
-cases, depends upon whether or 
not mental pain and suffering are 
natural
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and probable consequences of the breach of contract. When such is thecase damages for mental suffering are allowed. Beasley v. Western UnionTel. Co., 39 Fed. Rep., 181; Hale v. Bonner, 82 Tex., 33. But they are notallowed when the mental suffering is a remote consequence- Illinois Cent.R. Co. v.' Siddons, 53 Ill. App., 607. Damages for mental suffering, inactions for breach of contract, can never be recovered by one who is nota party tothe contract. Wells v. Fidler, 4 Tex. Civ. App., 213.
DivoRcE-Djs.IsSAL OF BILL-GUILT OF BOTH PARTIES.-WILSON V.WILSON, 132 N. W., 401 (NFl;.).-Held, that upon an application for adivorce, where both karties are found guilty of any of the enumeratedoffenses for which a divorce may be granted, the court should dismiss thebill. Root, J., dissenting in part.-
The doctrine of recrimination is but an application of the maxim ofequity that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Hoff v.Hoff, 48- Mich., 281; Mattox v. Mattox, 2 Ohio, 233. At common lawadultery was the "only offense pleaded as recrimination. Cocksedge v.Cocksedge, 1 Rob. Eccl., 90. If the complainant is guilty of the sameoffense as the defendant, there can never be a divorce. Duberstein v. Duber-stein, 171 Ill., 133; Derby v. Derby, 21 N. J. E., 36. And by the weight ofauthority the offense pleaded in recrimination need not be of the samenature as the defendant's offense, provided, of course, that it is one whichof itself would be a cause for divorce. Cassidy v. Cassidy, 63 Cal., 352;Cumming v. Cumming, 135 Mass., 386. And no more evidence is requisiteto establish a recriminatory charge made in an answer than would be need-ful to establish a lige charge in an original libel for divorce. Schouler"Husband ard Wife," pg. 565; Pollock v. Pollock, 71 N. Y., 137. How-ever there are a few States which demand that the two offenses must beof the same character. Bast v. Bast, 82 Ill., 584; Dillon v. Dillon, 32 La.Ann., 643. Some States allow recrimination charges not to prevent thedivorce but to reduce the alimony. Buerfening v. Buerfening, 23 Minn., 563
EASEMENTS-PRIVATE WAYS-APPURTENANT TO LAND.-HAMIfONDS ETAl. V. EADS ET AL., 142 S. W., 379 (Ky.) .- Held, that under a deed givingthe grantee the right to pass over the remaining lands of the grantor toreach the lands conveyed when an adjoining stream should be "past ford-ing," the right of way was not personal to the grantee, but appurtenant tothe land.
An easement is never presumed to be in gross when it can fairly beconstrued to be appurtenant to some estate. Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass.,591; Oswald v. Wolf, 126 Ill., 542; Sanxay v. Hunger, 42 Ind., 44. Whetherthe right of way, in the principal case, is appurtenant to land or in grossshould be determined by the nature of the right and the intention of theparties creating it. Valentine v. Schreiber, 3 N. Y. App. Div., 235; Frenchv. Williams, 82 Va., 462. A granted right of way is not in gross when
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there is anything in the deed or the situation 
of the property which indi-
cates that it was intended to be appurtenant 
to the land granted. Lathrop
v. Elsnzer, 93 MXlich., 599; Kuecken v. Valtz, 
110 Ill., 264. And it is a
general rule that where an easement is 
manifestly intended for the benefit
of the principal estate it will be held 
to be a permanent easement rather
than a personal one, and this although 
no words of inheritance are used.
Chappel v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 62 Conn., 
195; Hagerty v. Lee, 54 N. J. L.,
580. The fact that the right of way 
is to be used in connection with the
occupancy of the grantee's land, and 
is useless for any other purpose, will
overcome any presumption that it was 
to be intended to be in gross that
might otherwise arise from the absence 
of the words "heirs and
assignees." Lidgerding v. Zignego, 77 
Minn., 421.
GRAND JURY-REFUSAL OF WITNESS 
To ANSWER-PROMISE OF IMMU-
NITY.-EX PARTE NAPOLEON, 
144-S. W., 269 (TEm.) .- Held, a 
witness
before a grand jury may, after having 
been promised immunity in prose-
cution, be compelled to answer incriminating 
questions. Davidson, C. J:,
dissenting in part.
Since the case of Counsehnan v. Hitchcock, 
142 U. S., 547, it has beeiT
admitted law that the Fifth'Amendment 
to the United States Constitution
.protects a person from any incriminating 
self-disclosure in any proceeding,
civil or criminal. But the authorities 
are not in entire accord in the
application of this rule to cases 
where immunity is promised. 
Numerous
cases hold that a witness will be 
compelled to answer if granted complete
immunity. Re Van Tine, 12 How. 
Pr., 507; Kendrick v. Corn., 78 
Va., 492;
R. V. Charlesworth, 2 Fost. & 
F., 326. Some cases hold that 
a witness
will be required to answer if secured 
against prosecution for the offenses
he discloses. Brown v. Walker, 
161 U. S., 591; Ex parte Cohen, 
104 Cal.,
524. But the weight of authority 
seems to be that a witness should 
not
be compelled to answer if the only 
security is that his testimony will 
not
be used against him, since it may 
lead to the discovery of new evidence 
on
which the witness might be convicted. 
Counselnian v. Hitchcock, supra;
Re Walsh, 104 Fed., 518; People ex 
rel Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N. Y.,
253; Chappell v. Chappell, 116 N. 
Y. App. Div., 573. Contra, Mackel 
v.
Rochester, 42 C. C. A., 427; State 
v. Quarles, 13 Ark., 307. In United
States v. James, 60 Fed., 257, it was 
held that a person cannot be deprived
of the constitutional guarantee even 
if immunity be stipulated in a United
States statute, but this holding 
was subsequently overthrown in 
Brown v.
Walker, supra; the latter case being 
followed in Commerce Commission
v. Baird, 194 U. S., 25.
HO.MtICIDE--THREATs-EvIDENC.-OLIvE 
v. STATE, 57 So., 66 (ALA.).-
Held, that threats to kill someone 
not definitely designated, when 
made
shortly before the commission of 
the offense to which they may be 
con-
strued to refer, are admissible, in 
connection with other -explanatory 
cir-
cumstances and on proof of the corpus 
delicti.
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The leading case is in accord with the rule allowing a general homi-cidal intent to be shown when it has an obvious bearing on consequen-tial acts. Ford v. State, 71 Ala., 385; State v. Widahl, 95 Ia., 470; Hop-kins v. Comm., 50 Pa. St., 9. It follows that the same rule is applicablewhen the threat is directed against an entire family or class of persons.Palmer v. People, 138 IIl., 356; State v. Hunt, 128 N. C., 584. -But wherethe accused asserted two weeks before the homicide that he intended toemulate his parent and "kill his man' it was held incompetent to shuwmalice. Comm. v. Matthews, 89 Ky., 287. Threats to kill someone withintwenty-four hours are evidence of malice prepense. Hopkins v. Comm., 50Pa., 9; and declarations of a defendant that he felt like killing someoneare admissible to show his frame of mind. Muscoe v. Comm., 87 Va., 960.Statements of a person that he would kill anyone attempting to arrest himare admissible in behalf of an officer prosecuted for homicide. Harris v.State, 72 Miss., 99; but the evidence tending to indicate mere prejudice isproperly excluded. State v. Tise, 33 S. C., 582. The admissibility ofevidence of threats is not affected by the nearness or remoteness of thedate of the commission of the threatened crime. State v. McNally, 87 lk1o.,644; nor does the fact that threats were made indirectly or by innuendomake proof of them irrelevant. State v. Tarter, 26 Or., 38; but in all casesthe threat must be capable of being construed against the person finallyattacked. Henson v. State, 120 Ala., 316; People v. Farley, 124 Cal., 594.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-SEPARATE MAINTENANCE-JURISDICTION OFEQUITY-MCCADDIN V. MCCADDIN, 82 ATL., 554 (MD.) .- Held, that a courtof chancery has power to entertain an application by a wife against herhusband for alimony, though she does not ask for a divorce.
It has been well established in England that even ecclesiastical courts-as well as courts of equity and law-will award alimony only as incidentalto some other proceeding, as, commonly, divorce. Ball v. Montgomery,2 Ves. Jr., 191; Duncan v. Duncan, 19 Ves., 394. This doctrine is followedin most American jurisdictions. Shannon v. Shannon, 2 Gray, 285; Moonv. Baum, 58 Ind., 194; McIntire v. Mcln tire, 80 Mo., 470. There is, how-ever, considerable American authority-emanating, apparently, from anextraordinary provision inserted in the commissions of the English judgesof equity at the time of Cromwell-which deems it an inherent power ofequity to grant alimony-but not divorce-where alimony alone is sought.Pearce v. Pearce, 132 Ala., 221; Butler v. Butler, 4 Littell, 201; Bishop onMarriage and Divorce, Vol. 2, Sec. 353. This authority has been con-ferred by statute upon many of the jurisdictions which formerly deniedits existence, and in other jurisdictions its existence has been confirmed.Bigelow v. Bigelow, 120 Mass., 320; Harding v. Harding, 144 IIl., 588. InEngland, too, right to bring an independent action for alimony has beenprovided for by a series of statutes extending the powers of courts ofsummary jurisdiction. Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 58& 59 Vict., c. 39. For what causes this relief will be granted where theauthority to administer it is acknowledged, is most uncertain. Roughly,
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causes of sufficient gravity to enable a wife 
to maintain an action of divorce
a mensa et thoro, will support an independent 
suit for alimony. Hewitt v.
Hewitt, 1 Bland, 101; Johnson v. Johnson, 
125 Ill., 510. Yet it has been held
that even adultery will not sustain such 
a suit. Hair v. Hair, 10 Rich. Eq.,
163.
INFANTS-VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS-ESTOPPEL 
TO DENY-COUNTY BOARD
OF EDUCATION V. HENSLEY, 
144 S. W., 64 (Ky.).-Held, that when 
an
infant, by reason of his appearance, 
surroundings, and activities, coupled
with a misrepresentation or fraudulent 
concealment, leads one, who deals
with him in good faith and not knowing 
that he is an infant, to believe
that he is of age, he will be estopped 
from maintaining an action to avoid
his executed contract.
At common law and at law in England 
today, an infant is not estopped
by any fraud of his own whereby he 
induced another to contract with
him, from repudiating such a contract. 
Bartlett v. Wells, 1 B. & S., 836.
The great preponderance of American 
authority holds that an infant is
not estopped from setting up his infancy 
as a defense to an action on a
contract, even though he secured the contract 
by falsely representing him-
self to be of age. Bursley v. Russell, 10 
N. H., 184; Merriam v. Cunning-
ham, 11 Cush., 40; Sins v. Everhardt, 102 
U. S., 300. Contra, Commander
v. Brazile, 88 Miss., 668. But where 
the infant, or late infant, is seeking
affirmative relief from a conveyance or 
other executed contract which he
has obtained by such fraudulent representations, 
many cases hold that he
is estopped from basing his petition 
on the fact of his infancy. Ryan v.
Growney, 125 Mo., 474; Hayes v.,Parker, 
41 N. J. Eq., 630. Contra,
Tobin v. Spann, 85 Ark., 556. One who, 
with knowledge of the facts,
receives and retains the proceeds of a 
sale made when he was an infant,
has frequently been deemed to be estopped 
from alleging his infancy in
a suit to set aside the sale. Price v. Winter, 
15 Fla., 66; Pursley v. Hays,
17 Iowa, 310. On the other hand, 
it seems generally agreed that an
estoppel is not created by mere failure to 
give notice of the fact of infancy.
Buchanan v. Hubbard, 96 Ind., 1; Thormaelen 
v. Kaeppel, 86 Wis., 378. In
a few States it is provided by statute that 
a contract cannot be disaffirmed
where on account of an infant's misrepresentation 
the person dealing with
him had reason to believe him legally 
capable of contracting. Beickler v.
Guenther, 121 Iowa, 419; Dillon v. Burnham, 
43 Kans., 77.
INjUNCrIoDiSMIissAL-CosTs-A oRNEY'S FEEs.-MIDGETr 
V. VANN,
73 S. E., 801 (N. C.).-Held, that attorney's 
fees are not recoverable as
costs for damages by defendant in an 
action for an injunction.
Counsel fees will be allowed for so much 
of the action as concerns the
injunction. High Ini., §§1688-1690; 
Brown v. Jones, 5 Nev., 374; Derry
Bank v. Heath, 45 N. H., 524. Contra, 
Ferguson v. Baker, 24 Ala., 402;
Bullock s'. Ferguson, 30 Ala., 227. The 
leading case on this point is Cook
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v. Chapman, 41 N. J. Eq., 152. This rule is laid down in Alabama, Cali-fornia, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Missouri, Nevada, New Hamp-shire New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Virginia, West Virginia; in Iowa,Mississippi, and Washington, it is regulated by statute. In Arkansas,Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, SouthDakota, Texas and Vermont, the rule is repudiated, while in Connecticut,Massachusetts, North Dakota and Rhode Island there are conflicting cases.Stringfield v. Hirsch, 29 S. W., 611. In the United States Supreme Court,such fees are not allowed. Oelricks v. Spain, 15 Wall., 211.
INSURANcE-FIRE INSURANCE-INEGLIGENCE OF INSURED-EFFECT.-FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF NOME v. GERMAN, AMERICAN INSURANCE CO.,134 N. W., 873, (N. D.).-Held, that no recovery can be had for the lossof personal property in a fire where the evidence discloses that no properdiligence on plaintiff's part was exercised to save the same.
In fire risks one of the objects of insuring is to secure indemnityagainst the consequences of negligence. Joyce on Insurance, p. 2789. Neg-ligence of a servant or willful negligence of an employee of the insuredis no defense even though there be a clause freeing the insurance com-pany from liability in case of negligence by the assured. Wertheiner-Swarts Shoe Co. v. U. S. Casualty Co., 172 Mo., 135. Some courts holdthat gross negligence in absence of corrupt design defeats recovery.Chandler v. Worcester Ins. Co., 3 Cush. (Mass.), 328; Huckins v. People'sIns. Co., 31 N. H., 238. Gross negligence exempts the insurance companyfrom liability if it is such want of diligence which even careless men areaccustomed to exercise. Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Barringer, 73 Ill., 230. Othercourts have held that the doctrine of contributory negligence does notin any way apply to rights under a contract of insurance unless soexpressly stipulated. Traveller's Its. Co. v. Randolf, 78 Fed., 754; Schneiderv. Insurance Co., 24 Wis., 28. Negligence is no defense because it is theremote cause of loss. Biddle on Insurance, Sec. 645. However, it isestablished by the weight of authority that recovery may be defeatedbecause of negligence, if it be so willful as to amount to fraud. Vance onInsurance, p. 45; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Owens, 69 Kan., 602.If there be a stipulation against negligence, only such recovery is preventedas the value of the property which could have been saved by the use ofthe reasonable means at the insured's ecommand. German American Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 75 Ark., 251.
LIFE EsTATES--"INcoAIE"-RIGHTS OF LIFE TENANT.-IN RE BALDWIN,133 N. Y. Supp., l109.-Hefd, that a dividend on corporate stock forminga part of a trust estate paid in bonds and scrip from the accumulatedearnings of the corporation is "income" and should be distributed to thelife tenants and does not belong to the remaindermen.
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The early English rule gave all extraordinary dividends 
declared dur-
ing the life estate to the corpus and not to the income. 
Brander v. Brander,
4 Ves. Jur., 800. The later English rule is that scrip 
dividends are capital
and go to the remainderman even though declared 
from profits earned
after the death of the testator. Bouche v. Sproule 
(1887), L. R., 12 App.
Cas., 385. This rule is followed in America by the United 
State Supreme
Court and some of the States, being known as 
the Massachusetts rule.
Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S., 549; Greene v. Bissell, 
79 Conn., 547; Rand
v. Hubbell, 115 Mass., 461. The criterion of the 
Massachusetts rule is
whether the dividend is one of scrip or one of cash. 
Minot v. Paine, 99
Mass., 101. The Rhode Island courts have a somewhat 
similar rule in
that they in general prefer the remainderman to the 
life tenant. Parker
v. Mason, 8 R. I., 427; Greene v. Smith, 17 R. I., 28. 
The Pennsylvania
rule makes the time of the earnings its criterion, awarding 
the scrip divi-
dend to the remainderman upon finding it declared 
from earnings prior
to the life estate's inception; Smith's Estate, 140 Pa., 
344; but if accumu-
lated after the formation of said life estate, then to 
the life tenant as
income, this being the prevailing rule. Thomas v. Gregg, 
78 Md., 545;
Pritchett v. Nash, 96 Tenn., 472. The New York rule, 
repudiating both
above rules, treats the dividend as accruing in its entirety 
to the life tenant
as of the date when it is declared. Hite v. Hite, 93 
Ky., 257; Re Ker-
nechan, 104 N. Y., 618.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WRONGFUL DIscHARGE 
OF SaRVANT-DAMAGES.
-HLFFERIcH V. SHERMAN, 134 N. W., 818 (S. D.).-Held, 
that an
employee suing, before the expiration of the period of 
his employment,
for his wrongful discharge, may recover damages for 
the unexpired term
of employment, though the trial is had before that time.
While it is unquestionably the general American rule that 
on an action
for breach of contract a wrongfully discharged employee 
may recover a
prima facie amount, by way of damages, equivalent to 
his wages at the
contract rate for the entire contract period of employment, 
if his action is
brought after the expiration of the contract term; yet there 
is a rather
slender line of cases holding that if his action is brought before 
the expir-
ation of the contract term of employment, his recovery will 
be restricted
to damages sustained up to the commencement of the action. 
Hamlin v.
Race, 78 Ill., 422; McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Cordsiemon, 
101
Ill. App., 140. Other decisions, in similar cases, permit 
the recovery of
damages sustained up to the time of the trial, but rigidly exclude 
the
recovery of all prospective damages. Darst v. Mathieson Alkali 
Works,
81 Fed., 284; McMullan v. Dickinson Co., 60 Minn., 156. It would appear,
however, that the best authority will now allow a wrongfully discharged
employee, suing on the breach of contract, to recover damages 
for the
whole period of the contract, even when his action is brought 
before the
contract period of employment was originally intended to expire. 
Pierce
v. Tennessee, etc., Co., 173 U. S., 1; Wilke v. Harrison Bros., 
166 Pa., 202;
Stearns v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 112 Mich., 651. In all 
such cases,
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the damages for the period between the breach of the contract and the timeof the trial may be mitigated in favor of the employer if he shows that thedischarged employee secured other remunerative employment during theperiod in question, or by the exercise of reasonable enterprise might havedone so. Leatherberry v. Odell, 7 Fed., 641; Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis.,355. In a like manner the probability of an opportunity for such employ-ment may be shown in mitigation of the prospective damages of theemployee. Pierce v. Tennessee, etc., Co., supra; Boland v. Glendale Quarry
Co., 127 Mo., 520.
MILITIA-ENLISTMENT OF MINoR.-AcKER v. BEL., 57 Sou. (FLA.), 356.-Held, that under the Constitution and laws of Florida, a minor over theage of 18 years is bound by his enlistment into the military service of theState, even though the consent of his parents was not obtained for such
enlistment.
At common law an enlistment of a minor was not voidable, either bythe infant himself or by his parent or guardian. King v. Inhabitants ofLytchet, Matraverse, 1 Man. & Ry., 25; Commonwealth v. Gamble, 11Searg. & R. (Pa.), 93. For such enlistment is not a contract only, butalso effects a change of status. Grimley's Case, 137 U. S., 147- Morrissy'sCase, 137 U. S., 157. In some jurisdictions the contract of enlistmenthas been held incapable of avoidance by the infant himself, though madewithout consent of parent or guardian; Porter v. Sherburne, 21 Me., 258;it re Dewey, 11 Pick. (Mass.), 265; but voidable at the instance of parentor guardian. McConologue's Case, 107 Mass., 154; Matter of Dobbs, 21How. Pr. (N. Y.), 68; Ex parte Burke, 4 Fed. Cas., 2 156a. Under cer-tain statutes, however, the enrollment of a minor is void unless made withconsent of parent or guardian. In re Kimball, 9 Law Rep. (Mass.), 500;In re Carlton, 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 471. But this does not apply to enlist-ment in voluntary organizations mustered into service by the Federalgovernment. Lanahan v. Berge, 30 Conn., 438; United States v. Lipscomb,
4 Grat. (Va.), 41.
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF SOUNDNEss-FOOD.--DULANEY ET AL.V. JONES & ROGERS, 57 So., 225 (Mrss).-Held, that a seller of provisionsintended for human food impliedly warrants soundness; but this is nottrue in the case of sale of feed for animals.
Where personalty is bought for a particular purpose known to theseller and the buyer does not inspect the goods, but trusts to the judgmentof the seller, there is an implied warranty that the goods will be reason-ably fit for that purpose. Troy Grocery Co. v. Potter, 139 Ala., 359; Burchv. Spencer, 15 Hun. (N. Y.), 504. Food sold for immediate human con-sumption by a dealer is impliedly warranted to be sound. Wiedenman v.Keller, 171 Ill., 93; Howard v. Emerson, 110 Mass., 320; Benjamen OnSales, p. 661. If a dealer sells to a dealer, or a non-dealer sells food, or
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if the buyer inspects the food, there is no implied warranty of soundness.
Mechem on Sales, Sec. 1356; Kent. Vol. 2, p. 478; Needham v. Dial, 4 Tex.
Civ. App., 141, but compensation for damages would be obtained 
in an
action for deceit. Burch v. Spencer, 15 Hun. (N. Y.), 524. A sub-pur-
chaser gets no implied warranty as a general rule. Williston on 
Sales, Sec.
244; Nelson v. Armour Pkg. Co., 76 Ark., 355, but an exception 
apparently
exists, in that, a manufacturer of food products in all cases impliedly 
war-
rants them to be fit for consumption. Nixa Canning Co. v. Lehman-Hig-
gins Grocery Co., 70 Kan., 664; Copas v. Anglo-American 
Provision Co.,
73 Mich., 541. The weight of authority seems to hold that an 
implied
warranty of soundness exists where food is sold for animals if the 
buyer
has no opportunity to inspect the goods before buying. Craft v. 
Parker
lVebb & Co., 96 Mich., 245. Some jurisdictions hold that a vendor selling
at a sound price in absence of inspection by the vendee impliedly 
warrants
soundness in quality. Kent, 2 Vol. 477-8; Timrod v. Shoolbred, I 
Bay
(S. C.), 324; contra, Dean v. Mason, 4 Conn., 428.
STATES-GRANT OF LANDs-EVOCATION.-CLEVELAND 
TERMINAL & V.
R. Co. ET AL. V. STATE EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 97 N. E., 967 (OHo).-
Held, that in conducting transactions with respect to its lands, 
the State
acts in a proprietary, and not in a sovereign capacity, and, being 
amenable
to all the rules of justice, which it prescribes for the conduct 
of its citi-
zens, it will not be permitted to revoke a grant of lands made 
upon a
valuable consideration, which it retains. Spear, J., dissenting.
Land grants by a State are deemed contracts. McGehee v. Mathis,
71 U. S., 143. The State has in general the same power to contract 
as a
corporation or an individual. State %,. Cobb, 64 Ala., 127; 
Woodruff v.
State, 3 Ark., 285. In entering into a contract, a State 
lays aside its
attributes as a sovereign and has the same rights and incurs 
the same
responsibilities as the individual. Carr v. State, 127 Ind., 204. 
The power
to dispose of State property is vested in the legislature, which 
may make
provision therefor by statute. State v. Torinus, 26 Minn., 1; Sun 
bury, etc.,
Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 33 Pa. St., 278. The statutory provision must 
be com-
plied with, or the sale will be void. State v. Missouri Bank, 45 
Mo., 528.
The State may repudiate a contract fraudulently produred, 
even though it
cannot place the other contractor in statu quo. People v. 
Stephens, 71
N Y., 527. But a valid legislative grant of lands is irrevocable. 
Terrett
v. Taylor, 13 U. S. (9 Cranch), 43. A grant of land executed 
by the State
as a gift is irrevocable. Franklin County Grammar School 
v. Bailey, 10
L. R. A. (Vt.), 403. Nor can the State modify or rescind 
a contract
entered into by it, unless such right has been reserved. Baker v. State,
77 N. Y. App., 528; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S., 
514. But
the contract may be modified with the consent of the 
other party thereto.
Ritchie v. State, 39 Wash., 95. However, the state cannot 
by contract
divest itself of the power of eminent domain. Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea (Tenn.),
121.
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TAXATION - COLLECTION OF TAXES - COUNTERCLAIM. - MORGANTON
SCHOOL V. McDowELL, 72 S. E., 108 (N. C).-Held, a sheriff cannot, whensued to recover the amount of taxes collected by him, set up a counterclaim
against the State.
It is generally held that no set-off can be made of tax money while onthe way from the tax-payer to the treasurer. Waterbury v. Lawler, 51
Conn., 171; Cont. v. Rodes, 5 Mon., 318; Wilson v. Lewiston, 1 W. & Seg't.,428. For a tax in its essential characteristics is not a debt, or in thenature of a debt. City of Camden v. Allen, 2 Dutcher, 398; Himmelman
v. Spanagel, 39 Cal., 389; Shaw v. Pickett, 16 Ver., 486. In Finnegan v.City of Fernandina, 15 Fla., 379, the Court said "debt is the subject matterof a set-off, and is liable to set-off; a tax is neither." So a sheriff cannotplead a set-off in a suit against him for taxes due and owing. State &Guilford v. Ga. Co., 112 N. C., 34. The same is true of a collector ofrevenue. Com. v. Rodes, 21 Ky., 318. Nothing but a quietus from theatditor can be pleaded. Corn. v. Rodes, supra. So where one pleads pay-
ment, the burden of proof is on him to show such payment. Walling v.illorgan Co., 126 Ala., 326. But a tax collector may claim compensation
due him for the services incident to the collection, but not compensation
for services in a distinct office. State v. Floyd, 28 La. Ann., 553. Nor canhe make himself a creditor against the State by purchasing claims against
the State. Frier v. State, 11 Fla., 300.
WITNESSES-EXAMIINATION-REFRESi-IING 
IEMORY.-ERDMAN V. STATE,134 N. W., (NEB.). 258.-Held, that a newspaper reporter testifying as awitness could not refresh his memory by reference to a newspaper article
based upon his original notes, the said newspaper article being a correct
reproduction of his original notes. Barnes and Fawcett, JJ., dissenting.
The old rule that the witness must be able to swear from memory isnow generally obsolete. Downer v. Rowell, 24 Vt., 343. The general ruleis that a witness may use a memorandum to refresh his memory if he hasan independent recollection of the facts. Stewart v. Morris, 88 Fed., 461;Southern Ry. Co. v. State, 165 Ind., 613. A few courts have held that anindependent recollection is unnecessary. Heyert v. Reubinan, 86 N. Y. S.,797; Loose v. State, 120 Wis., 115. A court reporter may give evidencefrom his notes even though he has no independent recollection of thefacts. Miles v. Walker, 66 Neb., 728. A surveyor was allowed to refreshhis memory from a copy of the minutes of his survey. Miller v. Shumway,
135 Mich., 654. The rule is established that a witness may use any mem-orandum or instrument to refresh his memory, provided he ultimately
testifies from his own recollection as thus refreshed. Shrouder v. State,121 Ga., 615; Commonwealth v. Burton, 183 Mass., 461; Ascheim v. Levin-
sohn, 91 N. Y. Supp., 157.
